

## Message Text

SECRET

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12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
----- 055432

O 241139Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3189

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3837

EXDIS

FOR HARTMAN FROM SHERER

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, PARM

SUBJ: CBM PARAMETERS

REFS: SECTO 1070

B. GENEVA 2552

1. SUMMARY: IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL A, WE HAVE CONTACTED REPS OF UK, FRG, AND FRANCE AN SEVERAL SMALLER ALLIES INDIVIDUALLY FOR REACTIONS TO PARAMETERS SET FORTH BY GROMYKO. THESE ALLIES ALL BELIEVE SOVIET OFFER IS INSUFFICIENT, AND THAT MORE SATISFACTORY RESULTS CAN REALISTICALLY BE OBTAINED WITH SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON SOVIETS. OF THE THREE NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, THESE ALLIES ALSO AGREE THAT IMING IS LEAST IMPORTANT, BUT ARE EVENLY SPLIT ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORT TO LOWER THRESHOLD OR INCREASE DEPTH OF AREA. ON THRESHOLD, SOME NOW BELIEVE THAT MOST PRACTICAL OUTCOME WOULD BE A NUMERICAL RANGE ON THE ORDER OF 20-25,000 VICE A SINGLE SET FIGURE. ON AREA, ALLIES NOT ONLY WISH SOVIETS TO INCREASE WIDTH OF BAND OF TERRITORY ALONG THEIR LAND BORDERS, BUT ALSO TO MEASURE BAND FROM SEA FRONTIERS IN BALTIC AND BLACK SEAS. HOWEVER, ALLIES HAVE LIMITED LEVERAGE TO EXACT THESE FURTHER CONCESSIONS WITHOUT USING MOVEMENTS ISSUE, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN REF B TO JOIN ALLIES IN DEVELOPING

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APPROPRIATE TACTICS. END SUMMARY

2. IN INDIVIDUAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIED DELEGATION CHIEFS AND CBM REPS ON MAY 21-22, WE HAVE CITED PARAMETERS PUT FORTH BY GROMYKO, EXPLAINING THAT WASHINGTON HAD ASKED FOR AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED VIEWS ON THIS OFFER. UNANIMOUS ALLIED REACTION WAS THAT SOVIET OFFER REPRESENTS PROGRESS, BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ACCEPTABLE END RESULT, AND NEARLY ALL ARE CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS CAN YIELD FURTHER IF ALLIES MAINTAIN CONSISTENT PRESSURE. ROMANIAN REP, FOR INSTANCE, INFORMED US ON MAY 22 THAT SOVIETS COULD IN FACT GO TO 200 KMS. AND 25,000 MEN, AND WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF OTHERS HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM SOVIETS OR OTHER WP MEMBERS. AUSTRIAN NEUTRAL CAUCUS LEADER IS ALSO CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY ACCEPT THRESHOLD AT 25,000 MEN. INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS OF SELECTED ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

3. UK: COULD CONCEIVABLY LIVE WITH 18 DAYS AND 150 KMS. IF NO MORE COULD BE ACHIEVED, BUT BELIEVE MORE IS POSSIBLE. ALLIES SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT FLANK REPS WHO WANT BAND OF TERRITORY MEASURED FROM SEA FRONTIERS IN BALTIC AND BLACK AS WELL AS FROM LAND BOUNDARIES OF OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS. "NO WAY" TO ACCEPT THRESHOLD AT 30,000. INITIAL REACTION OF UK DELEGATION CHIEF HILDYARD TO A NUMERICAL RANGE (I.E., 20-25,000) AT A LOWER LEVEL, INSTEAD OF A SINGLE FIGURE, WAS DUBIOUS. HILDYARD THOUGHT ACCEPTABLE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE 250 KMS, 25,000 TROOPS, AND 25 DAYS.

4. FRANCE: LEAST SATISFACTORY OF THREE FIGURES IS 150 KMS. ALLIES SHOULD INSIST ON 300-350 KMS., FOR POLITICAL REASONS, WITHOUT REGARD TO MILITARY ASPECTS. OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE WILL APPLY MEASURE TO ALL THEIR TERRITORY, AND SOVIETS SHOULD IN EQUITY APPLY IT TO A GREATER PORTION OF THEIRS. ON OTHER PARAMETERS, ALLIES SHOULD STICK TO U.S. PROPOSALS LAST YEAR FOR SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE--I.E., 20,000 MEN AND 30 DAYS.

5. FRG: 150 KMS. IS FAR BELOW EXPECTED FINAL OUTCOME  
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ON AREA. ALLIED THRUST SHOULD BE TO GET 300 KMS. SEVERELY LIMITED APPLICATION ON SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD BE BAD PRECEDENT FOR MBFR STABILIZING MEASURES. THRESHOLD LESS IMPORTANT, BUT ALLIES SHOULD AIM FOR NO MORE THAN 25,000. TIMING LEAST IMPORTANT, BUT 21 DAYS WOULD BE BETTER THAN 18.

6. NETHERLANDS: TIMING IS A MARGINAL ISSUE, BUT

ALLIES SHOULD PLACE EQUAL WEIGHT ON ACHIEVING MORE  
ACCEPTABLE AREA AND THRESHOLD.

7. NORWAY: THRESHOLD AT 30,000 WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.  
150 KM. BAND WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO SELL,  
BUT ISSUE IS MORE IMPORTANT TO CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
ALLIES THAN TO NORWAY. TIMING IS NOT A MAJOR PROBLEM.

8. CANADA: NO INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCEPTABLE MINIMA,  
AND WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW ALLIED CONSENSUS IN ANY EVENT.  
HOWEVER, MOST DIFFICULT OF THREE FIGURES IS 30,000  
THRESHOLD. PERHAPS IDEAL SOLUTION WILL BE AUSTRIAN  
IDEA OF A NUMERICAL RANGE OF 20-25,000. (AUSTRIAN  
VIEW IS THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT ANNOUNCE BELOW 25,000.  
BUT THE DE FACTO RESULT OF A THRESHOLD THIS HIGH WOULD BE THAT  
MANY SMALLER COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR  
NEUTRALS, WOULD ANNOUNCE NO MANEUVERS, SO THAT MEASURE WOULD TAKE ON  
A BLOC-TO-BLOC  
CHARACTER. A NUMERICAL RANGE, ON OTHER HAND, COULD  
CONSIST OF SOVIET MINIMUM, BELOW WHICH SOVIETS WOULD  
NOT BE EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE MANEUVERS, COMBINED WITH A  
LOWER FIGURE, AT WHICH LEVEL STATES WITH FEWER AND  
CHARACTERISTICALLY SMALLER MANEUVERS WOULD BE EXPECTED  
TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATION.)

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3190

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 03837

EXDIS

FOR HARTMAN FROM SHERER

9. TURKEY: TURKISH AIM IS TO ENSURE THAT MAJOR SOVIET  
MANEUVERS WITH TWO BRIGADES OF AIRBORNE TROOPS OR

EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS ARE NOTIFIED, BECAUSE OF VULNERABILITY OF BOSPORUS, BUT TURKS BELIEVE THRESHOLD AT 30,000 WOULD IN FACT COME CLOSE TO ACCOMPLISHING THIS, BEARING IN MIND LARGE NUMBERS OF SUPPORT FORCES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AIRBORNE OR AMPHIBIOUS ELEMENTS IN COMBINED MANEUVERS. ON AREA, TURKS WOULD PROBABLY BE SATISFIED WITH 150 KMS AS LONG AS BAND IS MEASURED INWARDS FROM BLACK SEA AS WELL AS LAND FRONTIERS, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH A SIMILAR (BUT LESS DEEP), BAND FOR NOTIFICATION IN TURKISH COASTAL AREAS. TIME FACTOR NOT OF MAJOR CONCERN.

10. COMMENT: FALLBACK POSITIONS PROPOSED BY US LAST SUMMER FOR CBM PARAMETERS WERE 500 KMS, 20,000 TROOPS, AND 30 DAYS. THESE WERE GENERALLY AGREED ORALLY BY POLADS AND NAC, BUT NOT PUT INTO WRITING. ALLIES NOW AGREE HERE THAT THERE WILL SOON BE NEED TO EXCEED THESE FALLBACK POSITIONS IN GIVE AND TAKE SESSIONS WITH PACT, BUT CAUCUS ALSO AGREED THAT MEMBERS SHOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION ON BASIS OF DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS, WITHOUT FURTHER NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS.

11. IN FORTHCOMING GIVE AND TAKE SESSIONS, ALLIES WILL NEED SOME BARGAINING LEVERAGE WITH PACT TO ELICIT FURTHER  
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CONCESSIONS. UP TO NOW LEVERAGE HAS BEEN BASED ON CAUTIOUS ALLIED MOVEMENT TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF "VOLUNTARY BASIS," BUT NOW THAT SOVIETS ARE INDICATING GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH UK TEXT FOR "VOLUNTARY BASIS," THIS LEVERAGE IS PRETTY WELL USED UP. ALLIES WOULD GAIN SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE ON PARAMETERS IF US DEL AS A TACTICAL, TRANSITIONAL MOVE WERE AUTHORIZED TO SUPPORT REDUCED ALLIED GOALS ON MOVEMENTS, AS RECOMMENDED IN REF B.

12. IN LIGHT OF ALLIED REACTIONS ABOVE, WE WOULD ENVISION USING THIS LEVERAGE TO BRING SOVIETS TO ACCEPT APPLICATION OF CBM'S IN 250-KM BORDER ZONE, INCLUDING SEA FRONTIERS IF POSSIBLE, AND TO LOWER THRESHOLD TO 25,000. IF SOVIETS WILL COME DOWN TO 25,000 FOR THEIR MANEUVERS, WE BELIEVE ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY ACCEDE TO NUMERICAL RANGE OF 20-25,000, SO THAT THEY AND NEUTRALS WOULD NOTIFY MANEUVERS AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER LEVEL. IN OUR VIEW, IDEA OF A NUMERICAL RANGE HAS ADDITIONAL MERIT, IN THAT IT WOULD BE MORE IN CHARACTER WITH OTHER CSCE RESOLUTIONS AS A POLITICAL DECLARATION OF INTENT, RATHER THAN A PRECISE, ARBITRARY FIGURE WITH PURELY MILITARY OVERTONES, AND IN THAT THIS SLIGHT IMPRECISION WOULD TEND TO PROTECT GOVERNMENTS THAT WERE UNCERTAIN OF THE EXACT NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN MANEUVERS FROM CHARGES ON NON-COMPLIANCE.

13. IF YOU HAVE NO OBJECTIONS, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PASSING  
THIS MESSAGE TO SECDEF FOR INFO,AND IF APPROPRIATE TO USNATO.  
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## Message Attributes

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